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ACCELERATORS AND THEIR GHOSTS
M. Reščič∗, R. Seviour, University of Huddersfield, Huddersfield, UK
W. Blokland, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Spallation Neutron Source, Oak Ridge, TN, USA
Abstract
The issue of particle accelerator reliability is a problem
that currently is not fully defined, understood nor addressed.
Conventional approaches to reliability (e.g., RBDs) strug-
gle due to a lack of data about specific component/system
reliability and failure.
There is a large body of beam current data retrievable
from operating accelerators that contains detailed informa-
tion about the accelerator behaviour, both before and after a
machine trip has occurred.
Analysing this data could provide insight and help de-
velop a new approach to address accelerator reliability. In
this paper, we propose a data-driven approach to detect-
ing emergent behaviour in particle accelerators. Instead of
attempting to identify every possible failure of a machine
we propose an alternative approach based around a change
in perspective, to knowing the normal default operational
behaviour of a machine. Taking action when a “ghost in
the machine” emerges that causes accelerator wide aberrant
changes to normal machine behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
The reliability of particle accelerators has been identified
as a key factor limiting the development of certain industrial
applications, such as Accelerator-Driven Systems for nuclear
waste-transmutation [1].
Current approaches to accelerator reliability focus around
conventional reliability techniques developed, such as Relia-
bility Block Diagrams (RBD), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),
etc [2–5]. Applying these approaches rigorously in acceler-
ator systems is hampered due to the limited data on compo-
nent failures [6]. In addition to the identification industrial
applications require a real time response to failure, reduce
both the number of trips per annum and decreasing the mean-
time-to-recovery of the system.
In this paper we examine an approach to accelerator re-
liability modeling looking for emergent behaviour in the
complex datasets, such as beam current/charge, created by
the diagnostics systems during the operation of the accel-
erator. An example of emergent behaviour is the ghost in
the machine. In Koestler’s book [7] the human brain is built
around earlier, primitive, structures, where the large number
of subsystems all act together forming human conscientious.
At times one, or several, of these smaller subsystems (the
ghosts in the machine) can emerge dominate in the brains
function, leading to extreme emotions, such as hate and
anger which leads to observable changes in the behaviour of
the larger system.
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For our research, the off-normal behaviour we are inter-
ested in is the machine trip of a particle accelerator - the
shutdown of the machine due to a failure (or to prevent a
failure).
This form of emergent behaviour is also found in electri-
cal power networks, where the complete grid is formed from
a large number of subsystems. Any change in behaviour of a
component within the network (e.g., a generator) is added to
and reflected in the frequency changes across the whole net-
work. This variation in Electric Network Frequency (ENF)
is used to detect off-normal behaviour in audio forensics.
The ENF criterion is a procedure from audio forensics [8,9]
where an audio recording authenticity is validated by extract-
ing low frequency mains hum and matching it to a reference
database.
In this paper we look to apply this same approach from
audio forensics, to particle accelerators. Using beam current
measurements as the observable information on normal and
off-normal accelerator behaviour, allowing us to search for
predictive characteristics of the signal just prior to a machine
trip.
Due to the high complexity of particle accelerators and
availability of sample data we have focused our research
on building a reference database of normal accelerator be-
haviour data where all the interconnected systems are oper-
ating in harmony.
With the data available to us we have concluded the al-
ternative approach of building a reference database of off-
normal behaviour is not feasible for our specific method.
This is due to a large number of potential failures (and com-
binations of them) and sparse data associated with specific
failures. Our selected approach enables us to identify unique
off-normal behaviour which is detected by matching pulses
to the reference database.
Although this proposed approach will not allow us to stop
an accelerator from tripping it does allow operations to take
steps to mitigate the trip. For example in some approaches
proposed for commercial ADS the system consists of mul-
tiple accelerators all hitting the same target. Knowledge of
when one accelerator is about to fail would allow operators
to ramp-up the other accelerators to compensate as the trip
occurs, hopefully increasing the up-time of the entire system.
METHODOLOGY
We are using a dataset from the Spallation Neutron Source
(SNS) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which contains
recorded current waveform in the linac section of the ac-
celerator. The data contains three types of waveforms [10]:
before the machine trip, during the machine trip and during
normal operation after the machine has recovered from the
trip. This allows us to extract unique patterns for each type
of pulse and store them in separate datasets, either training
sets or sample sets (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1: Zoomed section of a pre-trip pulse and normal
operation pulse superimposed.
Each pulse current waveform is sampled at 100 MS/s for
about 1 ms so the total pulse sample array length is 100000
sample points.
For each pulse array, we apply two procedures to gen-
erate the unique pulse signature. First procedure extracts
the individual bunches from the pulse array. First detection
threshold Tb is set at the mean value of all pulse values.
Then, moving along the pulse array we extract bunches as
the values pass over and under the Tb threshold
Second procedure is applied to remove the leading / trail-
ing edges from the detected bunches by using a sliding aver-
age window method. The leading and trailing segments of
the bunch array are removed to avoid relatively larger values
that could potentially bias the matching process.
Using a sliding average with a window of lw = 10 samples
we detect and trip the leading and trailing edges of detected
bunches.
Final step in preparation of the data is to concatenate
extracted bunches into a single array that represents the
pulses unique signature.
A training set is constructed by concatenating multiple
pulse signatures into a longer array representing the refer-
ence database. A sample set is constructed by storing the
pulse signatures independently for easier matching to the
training set.
The training set was composed of 100 good pulses and
2 sample sets composed of 50 bad (pre-trip) pulses and
50 good (normal operation) pulses respectively recorded at
SNS on 2015-05-05. After processing the data it yielded a
sample set of approximately 5 × 106 training datapoints and
100 sample arrays of 5 × 104 datapoints each.
In order to determine if a pulse sample from a sample set
matches or is similar to samples in the training set we define
the measure of likeliness to be the Correlation Coefficient
(CC). CC between two arrays x (a pulse from the sample
set) and y (a section of the training set pulse) of length L is
defined as:
CC(x, y) =
∑L
i=i(x[i] − x¯)(y[i] − y¯)
(L − 1)σxσy (1)
where x¯, y¯ represent array mean values and σx, σy standard
deviations respectively. The coefficient has values in the
range [−1, 1].
Matching of a sample is performed by sliding the shorter
sample array along the longer training set array. To deter-
mine if a given sample array s matches the training set S at
a given position i an arbitrary matching threshold TM must
be set. A match is defined when CC(s, Si) ≥ TM .
Given the matching process the number of matches a sam-
ple can have to a training set nm is contained in the interval
[0, dS/se]. To determine the optimal detection threshold
we performed a sweep of potential threshold settings and
measured the matching results.
To classify the results of matching an arbitrary sample to
a good training set we need to define the following possible
outcomes:
• True Positive (TP) a good sample was identified as
good as it matched the good training set at least once
• True Negative (TN) a good sample was not identified
as good and has not matched the good training set
• False Positive (FP) a bad sample has been identified as
good as it matched the good training set at least once
• False Negative (FN) a bad sample was not identified
as good and did not match the good training set
RESULTS
For every sample set (good and bad) we measure the
relative match results by dividing the number of samples
with more than 0 matches with the total number of samples
in the sample set, e.g., if 1 sample out of 10 would match
the database then the match success race would be listed as
0.1. Table 1 lists the matching results for the experimental
setup.
Table 1: Match Success Rates for Different Thresholds
TM TP TN FP FN
0.200 0.7600 0.2400 0.6600 0.3400
0.206 0.7400 0.2600 0.4800 0.5200
0.212 0.7200 0.2800 0.4400 0.5600
0.218 0.6600 0.3400 0.3600 0.6400
0.224 0.6400 0.3600 0.2800 0.7200
0.230 0.6000 0.4000 0.2000 0.8000
0.236 0.5800 0.4200 0.1200 0.8800
0.242 0.5400 0.4600 0.0600 0.9400
0.248 0.4600 0.5400 0.0200 0.9800
0.254 0.3400 0.6600 0.0000 1.0000
0.260 0.2400 0.7600 0.0000 1.0000
After analyzing the initial results we have observed that
for a given sample pulse the number of positive matches nm
detected varied between 1 and more than 100. This lead us
to introduce a secondary detection threshold Ts ∈ [1, 100]
which then redefined a match as: CC ≥ TM and nm > Ts .
The introduction of the stricter secondary threshold im-
proved the matching results. Figures 2 and 3 show the rela-
tive TP and FP matching success rates respectively plotted
over a range of TM and Ts threshold settings.
Figure 2: TP results, percentage of samples matching
database for given threshold settings.
Figure 3: FP results, percentage of samples matching
database for given threshold settings.
Figure 4 represents the difference between TP and FP
match success plotted over different TM and TN settings.
We have further extracted the most favorable results into
Table 2 where we list the threshold settings where the maxi-
mum TP success was reached together with the lowest FP
success.
CONCLUSION
The results presented in Table 2 show that the proposed
method successfully identified as much as 56% of good
pulses as good while at the same time falsely identifying
only 6% of bad pulses as good. Despite the big difference
between good and bad pulsematching themethod still misses
to identify 44% of good pulses as good.
Further steps need to be taken to verify the results are not a
statistical anomaly: the plan is to apply the method to a larger
data set from the same or different accelerator and indeed
Figure 4: Difference TP−FP for a range of thresholds TM
and Ts .
Table 2: Match Success Rates with Second Threshold Ts
Introduced
TM Ts TP FP
0.200000 90 0.600000 0.120000
0.200000 100 0.560000 0.060000
0.206000 60 0.620000 0.120000
0.206000 70 0.620000 0.100000
0.212000 50 0.580000 0.100000
0.212000 60 0.560000 0.060000
0.212000 70 0.540000 0.020000
0.218000 20 0.620000 0.120000
0.218000 30 0.620000 0.100000
0.218000 40 0.560000 0.060000
0.218000 50 0.520000 0.040000
0.242000 0 0.540000 0.060000
0.224000 10 0.600000 0.120000
verify that we can achieve a comparable or better success rate.
Another next step is to compare pulse structure and perform
matching on data acquired from different locations in the
SNS accelerator and investigate the potential implications
and differences.
The results we’ve presented are encouraging but they still
leave us with significant room for improvement to achieve a
success race feasible for industrial applications.
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